Enclosed boats, which had been cautiously adopted to protect tankermen from fire as they escaped damaged ships, became more generally fitted. And the concept of “on load” hooks, that enabled the falls to be released as the weight came off them when the boat reached the water became rapidly adopted.

No more would fingers be trapped as the bow or stern man tried to free the link of a heavy chain from a huge steel hook. No more would a boat be left hanging by a single fall, with way on the ship, after the man aft had bodged his release. The coxswain, with a single swipe of his lever, would free both hooks simultaneously, and the boat would move smoothly free.

Well, it should have worked like that always, but sadly it didn’t. And gradually we became aware of an increasing number of accidents happening to lifeboats, being prematurely released high in the air, to kill and injure the launching crews. Sometimes it was inadequate training, sometimes a complete misunderstanding, as when a crewman mistook a release lever for one of the engine controls, with fatal results.

Sometimes it was inadequate maintenance of poor materials subject to corrosion, in a vulnerable spot washed over by salt spray. Often the inquest or inquiry revealed that the hooks had failed to properly close when the boat had been last housed, and moreover, it was almost impossible to physically determine whether this was the case. And as the number of different types and makers of hooks proliferated, it became odds-on that a mariner joining a new ship would find the gear quite different to that of his previous vessel.

While the specialist lifeboat builders have tried to simplify and standardise their gear, shipbuilders have tended to buy equipment which was cheapest, and this has led to perhaps fifty or more different types of equipment “out there” at sea. Often, this cheap equipment has failed to stand the test of time, and has corroded or become unusable. Not infrequently, it has been identified as responsible after horrible accidents after boats have crashed onto the quay, or into the sea during drills and inspections.

Those older folk who had grown up with open boats, even radial davits with rope falls and simple hooks, and moreover who had become very familiar with their boats for recreation in a more leisured age, noted these trends with disbelief and dismay. They also noted the increasing fear with which mariners were regarding boat drills, which were the only chance they ever got to use boats in this high speed era. Too many different types of hook, not enough training, design flaws and inherent vulnerabilities, have been a fatal combination. The fact that lifeboats were killing and injuring more people than they ever saved was a statistical horror story.

Last month saw the IMO’s Design & Equipment Sub-Committee as covered by our friends at gCaptain, produce draft guidelines for the evaluation and replacement of lifeboat on-load release mechanisms. It will probably take a bit of time to work its way through the system before being translated into a SOLAS amendment, that will require replacement of dodgy gear, but it is an important step in the right direction. Decent shipowners won’t wait.

Experience has taught us that most casualties are caused by a human agency.

Therefore, when one reads that “shocking” deficiencies in lifeboat training and the use of a bewildering array of release hooks are putting the lives of seafarers at risk, I ask whether we should not have standardized equipment and, well, standardized training.

Also, when one reads of injury and loss of life, due to the lack of formal training requirements for work within enclosed spaces aboard tankers and chemical carriers, it does leave a bad taste in one’s mouth.

As to lifeboat drills, isn’t it annoying, to say the least, to read that: Richard Schifferli, the Paris MoU general secretary, has to say that “a drill can go wrong for a variety of reasons, but too often it is because crew assigned to a lifeboat are not familiar with that type of lifeboat release gear on board.”  Is this rocket science? Where’s the indignation?

On accidents in confined spaces: eleven senior master mariners point out, repeating the finding of the Marine Accident Investigators International Forum (MAIF) that, with 93 fatalities taking place in enclosed spaces aboard ship since 1997, its first area of  concern continues to be “lack of knowledge, training, and understanding of the dangers of entering enclosed spaces…”  Again, aren’t we ashamed?

I am reminded of the famous words of Inspector Renault, played by Claude Rains, in Casablanca: “I am shocked, shocked…”

Yes, we need better training, and rational conformity to a common design standard.  The training process begins at the cadet stage.  Or, at least, it should.  There must be meaningful drills, and not mere paper or certificate compliance.

Safety at sea, and particularly the protection of those who work in the merchant service, must in this Year of the Seafarer, be our number one priority.  Your comments on how we can improve formal training requirements and drills will be most welcome.