From there, the crew is able to observe the pirates using remote cameras, welcoming the attackers with tear gas, darkening all the spaces which are then filled with smoke. There was, it is reported, that there was some scepticism about the proposals among those viewing the presentation, with doubts about whether these passive measures would be sufficient to deter the tough Somali pirates.

Meanwhile there seems to have been an extraordinary amount of wailing from the usual suspects at the robust defence mounted by armed guards on a ship actually being attacked, where the guards were filmed – shock-horror – firing back at the miscreants and driving them off.  There have even been demands for an inquiry at the iniquity of this tough defence, although it is good to see that this has been resoundingly dismissed by the flag state. One also has to wonder at the wisdom of the media identifying both the operators of the ship and the providers of the armed protection.  Nobody seems to have thought about asking the crew whether they thought that the efforts of their armed guards to protect them had been disproportionate. But then, nobody ever asks the crew anything.

It would be interesting to ask them whether they would rather be protected by a team with high velocity rifles and a willingness to occasionally fire them, or sit grimly in their citadel sniffing tear gas and smoke, as enraged pirates rampage around their ship, getting angrier and angrier. I expect they would tell you.

Endless television programmes, featuring Titanic experts (a highly specialist expertise that nevertheless seems in plentiful supply) discussed, with the benefit of a century’s hindsight, every conceivable aspect, from the construction of the ship to the conduct of the master and the final tunes played by the ship’s musicians. Social anthropologists and left-wing commentators on class have discussed ad infinitum the social balance of the victims and survivors. There doesn’t seem a great deal more to say, although the authors of at least thirty new books on the subject are saying it over several hundred thousand words.  The bill for the Titanic’s construction was in the region of £1.5 million. The net worth of the industry that has sprung up around the world’s most famous (or notorious) ship must exceed this by many multiples.

Some contemporary comments on the loss of the great ship were instructive, with the marine profession united in its deprecation of the British board of inquiry’s conclusion that excessive speed in the vicinity of known ice was the principal cause of the loss. The Nautical Magazine railed against the “secret pressure put upon masters to keep up speed”.  Joseph Conrad, by 1912  an author of international distinction , commented about the sadness of dying “for commerce”, but added that “….the responsibility remains with the living, who will have no difficulty replacing them by others, just as good, at the same wage…”

Speed of course is responsible for plenty of accidents today, so in this important matter, we seem to have learned little from the Titanic and all those hundreds of casualties in which speed has been a major contributor over the years. It is worth giving the last word on this particular subject to that hugely experienced mariner and author , the late Captain Richard Cahill, who discussed this most famous casualty in his “Disasters at Sea” . “The answer was then and is still today” he noted “that owners are against recklessness as long as it does not put them at a competitive  disadvantage. Now there’s the subject for serious debate, once all the commemorations are concluded.

I did say, and would now repeat, the following:

• In what is perhaps the seventh year of statements from our Great and Good, the most that could be said is that our industry has promoted purely defensive measures, such as “best practices”, the use of citadels, and seemingly interminable discussions on the vetting and use of armed guards.

• Lloyd’s List has pointed out that spokesmen for industry trade associations, at CMA, condemned a proposed ban on ransoms.  I agree with them; however, speeches alone are not enough.

• As the March 27 Lloyd’s List leader notes, “Since the escalation of piracy into the Indian Ocean, shipowners have gradually come round to the view that the fight against piracy will have to include offensive as well as defensive tactics”.  Yes, and haven’t some of us been saying this for at least 5 of the past 7 years?

• A number of commentators have advocated an international agreement on the suppression of piracy, to promulgate and clarify the rules.  This has gotten slight support from industry groups and little notice in the media.

• As the March 27 Lloyd’s List leader states, “Some [shipowners] have called for the UN Security Council to allow maritime nations guarding shipping in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to exercise war powers that extend their range of actions beyond defending ships under imminent threat of attack”.  Doesn’t that make sense?

• In my statement at CMA, I criticized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  It has been said that NATO stands for “No Action, Talk Only”.  I don’t believe that this is so, as NATO can, since the end of the Cold War, point to successes in the case of Libya, this past year, and the former Yugoslavia some years ago.  That said, I believe that governments – notably the United States – are more interested in fighting Al Qaeda, or more generally in the war on terrorism, than in suppressing piracy.  I also suspect that some intelligence agencies view elements of the Somali tribal potpourri, such as in “Puntland”, as potential or actual allies in that war, and have therefore deliberately exercised restraint in acting against them.  Is it not time that we took this possibility into account?  Could we not, as advocates for the seafarers who are victims of this policy speak out against it?

• Lloyd’s List, in its two leaders, does not mention the spread of piracy into West African waters, which is compelling evidence that the current incoherent “policy” is failing.  Should we not point this out?

• Lloyd’s List notes that “Shipowners have urged the combined naval forces to target mother ships”.  That is correct, but our industry leaders have been largely silent about this, as they have about other affirmative measures.  Shouldn’t we call attention to the need for action – assuming that there is such a need?

• Lloyd’s List makes the point that, “The legality of piracy efforts becomes more complicated once naval forces pursue pirates into domestic waters.”  This is very true; it is a problem largely because no specific international rules, convention or agreements exist on the suppression of piracy.

• No proper Hague-style tribunal for the trial of accused pirates has been provided for.  One is surely needed; our industry spokesmen have not raised this point, either.

• The current practice of “catch and release” contributes to the impression that pirates are immune from justice.  Our industry leaders, and our principal media outlets have taken little apparent notice, or are apparently unwilling to comment one way or another.

• The maritime media contain articles on many peripheral aspects of defensive measures, the latest being about “floating arsenals”, presumably needed to dole out weapons and ammunition to the growing number of armed guards.  While defensive measures are all well and good, they do nothing to control or defeat the scourge of piracy.  There are a number of affirmative measures, some of which are listed here, and some of which are not of a violent nature, that are needed.

• I also made the point, at CMA, that while modern international navies – notably that of the United States – are able to deploy massive weapons platforms and systems, they are seemingly unable, under the present rules of engagement, to simply keep the sea lanes open and safe.  This interesting lesson is no doubt not lost on the Iranian Republican Guard; it demonstrates how a “low tech” force of relatively small craft may be used in the future to disrupt and harass international trade with impunity.  This should certainly be of concern to the NATO governments.

• International naval forces continue to be hamstrung with restrictive rules of engagement.  We should all speak out, with one voice (remember that expression?), against this folly.

I’m gratified that my friends at Lloyd’s List describe me as being “one of [the media’s] own”.  They stopped short of calling me a journalist, but I’ll let that pass.

As you’ll see by the attached photographs it was a great day and a chance to celebrate all the good work these institutions do.

In short, the aftermath of such a marine accidents will occupy large numbers of specialists, from average adjusters and lawyers, along with the salvors and wreck-removal specialists, several years of expensive activity. Insurers will pay, of course, but this will be eventually spread liberally through the industry.

On the Chinese coast a not dissimilar accident to the Bareli – a ship of comparative size -looks suspiciously like a salvage and wreck removal operation of similar timescale. Might something be going wrong here in the liner trades, which many of us were brought up to believe was the “Rolls-Royce” end of the shipping industry, but now seems to be scraping the bottom of the standards barrel? Should we be concerned that ships four times the size of Rena and Bareli are sailing the seas in some numbers? You bet.

If you were something of a sceptic, you would suggest that the so-called “liner” trades are now dominated by two cultures – one the one hand that of cheapness, and the other the need for schedule precision. They are difficult to reconcile, with the desperate need to satisfy the charterers and the shippers screaming for their just-in-time goods, with the lines trying furiously to control their costs. One might also suggest that the fact that the ships are regarded as nothing more than delivery vehicles, and their crews as mere drivers, also tends to diminish their sense of self-worth. This is not exactly helped by the miserable existence of those aboard ships which are operating under the accountants’cosh.

Unfair to blacken the reputation of an entire sector? Possibly, although it might be recalled that the same sort of reputation attached to those who operated tankers, perhaps twenty years ago. It is tankers today which lead the field in maritime standards, and the containership operators, who don’t even know what is in the boxes they carry half the time, which bring up the rear. Maybe we should do something about this problem before the first 16,000TEU ship charges up on some reef.

This blogspot has said – repeatedly- that a rethink, and to some extent a new approach, will be needed if pirate attacks are to be contained, not to say reduced. The “business model” now employed by pirate gangs is relatively low-risk and is sufficiently remunerative to, at least, its leaders, that it is likely to spread into new areas, such as parts of coastal South America.

Whatever it is that we are now doing — “best practices”, the presence of armed and unarmed security teams embarked aboard ship, and various talking shops: Working Groups 1 and 3 of the Contact Group for Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s Counter-Piracy Programme, to name a few, the frequency and geographical area of this brutal affliction hasn’t been significantly affected. The type of thuggery now occurring with growing frequency off the Nigerian coast, some of it 110 miles offshore, is significantly more violent than the Somali variety.

The result: the vulnerability of modern merchant ships is now clear, and “best practices”, while an effective defence strategy in most cases, is not a remedy for the rising tide of violence. It is clear that an international convention on the suppression of piracy is essential.

Why? The much-discussed solution, a return to the rule of law in Somalia, and elsewhere in Africa where pirates lurk, is unlikely for many years to come.

Moreover, we need a proper court or tribunal for the trial — and subsequent imprisonment — of pirates. Various “solutions”, such as trial in the Seychelles, or some other African venue, are no solutions at all, for a plague that now is spreading to other parts of the world. A convention would establish a court of global jurisdiction based on the pattern of the International Criminal Court (the Hague Tribunal).

The navies now charged with duty off the coast of Somalia, and probably elsewhere, are hobbled by so-called rules of engagement that are in many ways inappropriate or ineffective. A comprehensive international convention would impose a framework of agreed-upon law, that would eliminate many of the inadequacies and ambiguities, including those surrounding the practice known as “catch-and-release”. Such a convention would define, hopefully with some precision,
the rights and wrongs of what is, after all, a military confrontation in the first place.

It is remarkable that war crimes committed in, say, Bosnia or Sierra Leone, are within the jurisdiction of a court of justice, in the Hague, set up under an intergovernmental agreement. In addition, governments have mustered the will to suppress international money-laundering, human trafficking, the arms and narcotics traffic, and of course terrorism. For a number of reasons, the growing scourge of piracy is being “handled” in a way reminiscent of the opening scene of “The Pirates of Penzance”. We seem to want to do as little as possible, while pretending to
be greatly concerned.

A convention on the suppression of piracy could (repeat, could) allow for the payment of ransoms. Right now, each government is free to allow or prohibit the ransoming of hostages.

Everyone seems to be willing to jog along with this state of affairs, except the hapless seafarers.

Several hundred crew are currently being held under terrible conditions. And, as piracy expands, it is clear that some of its practitioners, as in West Africa, are not interested in ransom negotiations, but are “just” robbers and hijackers. This puts the lives of the crew at greater risk than before.

Many observers say that it is only a matter of time until a major incident occurs; maybe one involving a cruise ship. If that happens, we may see a significant escalation of violence. Before we embrace such an increased militarisation, wouldn’t a comprehensive agreement on how piracy — and pirates — are to be dealt with make better sense?