He had perceived that seafarers, who only ever seemed to be noticed by landsmen when something had gone badly wrong, deserved some recognition, especially for some of the quite amazing things that they do in the hostile environment in which they work.

This year, the first day of the 27^th IMO Assembly, along with some heavy diplomatic representation, was treated to a truly amazing true tale of courage, with the award being presented to Captain Seog Hae-gyun, who had been master of the chemical tanker Samho Jewelry when she was seized by a large gang of Somali pirates. The crew had been in their designated citadel, but the pirates had broken in and detained them on the bridge of the ship which they ordered to be taken to the Somali coast.

The Republic of Korea master had other ideas, and in an effort to delay progress of the vessel so that Korean Navy vessels might catch up and attempt a rescue, he undertook all manner of highly risky strategems, such as steering a zig-zag course, interfering with the fuel mixture so that the engine misfired, pretending the steering gear was broken and slowing the ship down to six knots. Ordered to communicate to the owners in English, he surreptitiously inserted information in Korean about the true situation, hugely assisting the pursuing naval units. But the pirates realised that they were being duped and viciously attacked the master, causing serious fractures to his shoulders and legs.

Eventually as dawn broke on the second day of their captured passage, the ROK destroyer Choi Young launched their rescue operation and quickly captured most of the ship. However three armed pirates remained in the wheelhouse, and despite his serious injuries the master managed to get to the VHF and warn the rescuers of the dangers they still faced. Furious, the pirates shot the master four times, two bullets hitting him in the abdomen, as the bridge was stormed.

Eight pirates were killed and five captured in the operation but the master, near to death, was rushed ashore, first to Oman and then to his home country, where he underwent major surgery over an extensive period. As he accepted his award in London, ten months after the outrage, he still required a cane to help him walk.

Captain Seog did what he believed was best to protect his crew and his ship and very nearly died at the hands of these criminals who are making seafarers’ lives so difficult. He is a true hero of our times. There were also 38 different nominations for the award, which seems to show that there is still a great deal of courage being shown by people at sea. It is just that the Award helps to illuminate it all, for everyone’s benefit.

If I was a Somali pirate chief, or perhaps the Business Development Director of one of those gruesome gangs causing mayhem in world shipping circles, as we are informed they are now well organised along such formal lines, I would have annotated my 2011 wall chart with some enthusiasm last week. The Volvo Ocean round the world race started in Alicante on Saturday with its six yachts, all professionally crewed, en route to Cape Town.

From thence they are bound for a “safe haven”, presumably somewhere in the Indian Ocean, where the race will be interrupted, the six boats and competitors spirited safely into the Gulf, permitting a triumphant arrival into the sponsoring city of Abu Dhabi. The third leg, from Abu Dhabi to Sanya will also require a heavy security presence once outside the Gulf, and the exact route is not unexpectedly shrouded in secrecy.

There are six 70ft yachts which are taking on the challenge, and although each carries the manning of a fair size merchant ship, they would be very attractive targets for the criminal gangs. Volvo and Abu Dhabi – we are talking big bucks here, not the doubtful provenance of a shipowner who can’t be bothered to abide by Best Management Practice, and that alone might tempt pirates to try something special.

Ocean racing is a risky sport, and something that should not be altogether discouraged. But are the organisers not pushing their luck just a little with this seemingly pointless leg up into pirate-infested waters. I know Abu Dhabi have put a lot into this race, but if getting there, and defending the fleet on these two legs of the race deflect military forces from their main task of helping commercial shipping, is it really worth it? Or am I being a terrible killjoy, on the very day that the Prime Minieter of the UK has given permission for British merchant ships to carry armed guards, when, maybe, we should be celebrating?

The word “war” it was suggested, was too much for liberal stomachs, although the violent deaths of nearly 3000 people in an unparalleled act of aggression was scarcely the act of somebody wanting a peaceful negotiation.

There is another war which dare not speak its name, in the violent attacks being carried out on merchant shipping in the western Indian Ocean. Nobody seems to want to admit it, but the only sure fire method of defending a merchant ship against pirates intent on capturing it is by armed force from the defenders. Why is this so difficult a concept to grasp? Sure, Best Management Practice seems to work very well where there is a naval escort in the close waters of the Gulf of Aden; further afield it is rather more problematical, with ships on their own a long way from any military help which is anyway unwilling to tackle the pirates once they are aboard.

Meanwhile we have sundry flag states, and nations through which ships bound to and from these dangerous waters transit are getting all precious about the presence of arms aboard merchant ships. Do they think this is helpful in the present circumstances? Why should not small arms, properly secured during the vessel’s stay in port or during a Suez transit, be part of normal ship’s equipment, of no business of those in the ports ships visit?

There is something monstrously patronising about the attitude of governments and some of the military. What sort of idiots do they think merchant mariners are? In all previous periods of history, from the days when Barbary pirates were enslaving seafarers in the Mediterranean, to the Second World War, merchant seafarers were perfectly capable of defending themselves against enemies. At the outbreak of WWII, although military gunners were put aboard allied ships, it was the merchant seamen who, after a short course – often in a converted bus outside the dock gates – who manned the guns with which the ships were supplied. There are plenty of mariners who are experienced with small arms, and as the citizen army which has freed Libya has proved, you don’t need to be a professional soldier to frighten off an enemy with a rifle. How long do you think it takes to learn how to fire one?

We see endless articles, usually by lawyers heavily emphasising the risks if an armed seaman mistakenly shoots another, or fills some innocent fishing skiff full of lead. Liability rules. We live in a terribly risk averse society, let alone one manacled by “elf ‘n safety” rules and regulations. What the lawyers, the regulators, the bureaucrats, the well-meaning trade unions and the Egyptian and South African authorities fail to give merchant seamen as they steam off to “war” in the Indian Ocean, is any plausible alternative to their mealy mouthed  negativity. Like it or not, war it is and reasonable defence is surely …er…reasonable?

There is growing evidence that the American campaign against Somali “militants” – the current term applied by the great and the good to all sorts of thugs – is having an impact on anti-piracy countermeasures.

Whether this is a good thing is debatable, because some of the “nonstate actors” being sponsored by the United States may themselves include pirates.

The unwillingness of the United States to send American troops into yet another country, particularly after the United States was ejected in the ignominious “Black Hawk Down” incident of 1993, when Somali “militiamen” killed 18 American soldiers, has resulted in the funding and support by the United States of private security enterprises and local militant groups in various parts of Somalia.

It is reported that the Central Intelligence Agency has been central to a “quiet” but very perceptible escalation of operations in Somalia, part of which operates from a base at the airport in Mogadishu, the nominal capitol.

The Pentagon has recently launched strikes by drone aircraft aimed at the Shabab, the Somali militant group said to be allied with Al Qaeda.

According to a recent United Nations report, a number of companies, including Blackwater Worldwide and the South African Saracen International, have entered Somalia with contracts to protect Somali officials, to train African troops, and – interestingly – to “build a combat force to fight armed Somali pirates”.

The Pentagon has recently advised Congress that it plans to send nearly $45 million in equipment to strengthen the Ugandan and Burundian troops now also engaged in Somalia.

One of the United States proxies appears to be Bancroft Global Development, an American private security company that the United States Department of State has indirectly financed to train African troops.  Bancroft operates from an office in Washington, as a not-for-profit corporation presided over by Michael Stock, a resident of Virginia who graduated from Princeton University in 1999.

The increasing level of overt and clandestine activities in Somalia continues to focus on Puntland, a semiautonomous area in northern Somalia, in which Saracen International, referred to above, has contracted to train “a 1,000-member antipiracy militia” according to the New York Times.

Where this will all lead is difficult to judge; however, it is clear that efforts are being made ashore as well as afloat to aggressively counteract and, hopefully, eliminate Somali piracy.

A number of proposals, some of them sensible, and some of them unworkable, have been put forward.  In the midst of all of the fulminations, a few mysteries are being cleared up.

One of these mysteries is why the United States, as the only major power with a navy of proven efficiency, has done so little (I realize this will offend my British friends, but it’s now official: the Royal Navy hasn’t been as small as it is now since the Middle Ages).

There have for some time been rumours that the U.S. was pulling its punches with regard to the Somali pirates.  Intriguing new evidence has surfaced in a recent article by two experienced New York Times reporters, Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, detailing what appears to be happening behind the scenes.  The reality seems to be that the United States now considers Al Qaeda in Somalia, and its affiliate across the Gulf of Aden, to be a greater threat than the operatives in Pakistan who have been hit with hundreds of drone aircraft strikes, directed by the Central Intelligence Agency, in recent years.

The primary group of “militants”, as the The Times likes to call insurgents, is known as the Shabab. Not all of these people seem to be militias opposed to the United States.  There are also Somali clan militias, backed by Kenya and Ethiopia, that have reclaimed Shabab-held territory in Southwestern Somalia.

It has been implied that some Shabab fighters are in contact with the United States, while others are considered to be enemies.  More than thirty Somali-Americans, from cities such as Minneapolis, have traveled to Somalia in recent years.  An American military drone aircraft attacked several Somalis affiliated with the Shabab late last month, killing a number of individuals.  This strike was reportedly carried out by the United States Special Operations Command, which is believed to have a unit on the ground in Yemen.  It seems likely that American units, no doubt under deep cover, are also at work in Somalia.

There are said to be increasing operational ties between the Somali Shabab and the Qaeda franchise in Yemen, known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Penninsula, or A.Q.A.P. This group conspired to destroy a passenger plane headed for Detroit on Christmas day, 2009, and another attempt, later, to destroy cargo planes carrying printer cartridges filled with explosives.

The bottom line seems to be that the United States is trying to do what it has done elsewhere, namely, develop a system of proxy allies on the ground in Somalia.  This may prove to be a method by which piracy could be handled, if not suppressed, in a somewhat more effective way.  A more unpleasant possibility, however, is that the pirates themselves could turn into allies of the U.S. Special Operations Command.

It would not be the first time in history that this sort of “devil you know” transformation has happened.  We did it after the Second World War, in certain parts of Europe, during what is now called the Cold War.  Our allies then – erstwhile enemies – were in some cases nastier than today’s pirates.

Another “truth” that is repeated constantly is that “we’ve got to do something about piracy”, particularly the Somali variety, and that if our industry musters the “will”, whatever that is, the world will listen. And the third is that Greece’s (and Europe’s) current economic and political passion play has, and will have, no relevance to the Greek-owned shipping sector.

In my more than 40 years in shipping, I’ve learned that like most businesses, ours is dominated by relatively few voices, functioning within an echo chamber of mutually supportive expressions of internal consensus. These voices do not always take account of uncomfortable events outside: a failure that brings unpleasant surprises from time to time.

There are a number of reasons why the three “truths”, that I have referred to, aren’t actually true at all.

“Truth” no. 1 ignores the fact that sound risk management, as a good classification society will tell you, requires a programme that implements principles embodied in the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, the U.S. Oil Pollution Act (OPA ’90), SOLAS and MARPOL. These principles, particularly stringent internal and external audit procedures – in other words, sound corporate governance –  were notable for their absence leading up to every major oil spill up to and including (you guessed it) last year’s in the U. S. Gulf. They apply to shipping companies just as much as they do to oil companies and offshore rig operators. Perish forbid that the great and good should publicly take note of this.

“Truth” no. 2 maintains that the Great Powers are minded to heed the pleas of some of us, and take concerted action against Somali and other pirates. This is implicit is the mantra: “something must be done”. A related school of thought has been active in promoting the belief that mercenaries can be put into smallish private navies, and counter-attack the skiffs and “mother ships”. Well, of course this is possible, but the enormous liability exposure that it would entail has, it seems, not been fully considered. As for the notion that the Obama administration or China, or another Great Power, is willing to take on the pirates, that too is possible — just.  There are reasons, though, to doubt that any such thing is likely.

One is that the rise of Al Qaeda in the Gulf of Aden area is of greater concern to certain powers than a little thing like piracy, and that the said pirates – or their tribal colleagues – are adroitly selling their services, as allies, to certain famous intelligence agencies.

A second reason is that after the less-than-stellar performance of NATO & Co. re Libya, and the forthcoming U. S. skedaddle  from Afghanistan,  evidence exists that further military activities are being discouraged, for now. I can’t refrain from adding that our industry’s leaders have not been good at burnishing our image – not that they’ve tried very hard – with the result that our political leaders have very little stomach for pounding Somali villagers, and their husbands, with predator drones, J-Dams and Seal Team Six.

Yes, I know about the poor seafarers, but do they have effective spokesmen in the councils of the mighty? Show me. If something CAN be done, I don’t think we’re there yet.

“Truth” no. 3, that the Greek shipping sector is (more or less) unaffected by the increasingly messy situation in that country, has more merit than “truths” 1 and 2. Most Greek shipowners of my acquaintance have been careful not to get too close to Greek banks, much less the government. They tend, with good reason, to prefer foreign flags, foreign banks and foreign corporate domiciles. Those however who say that the present crisis will leave no imprint on the “mind” of the Greek shipping sector are mistaken. The present spot of trouble only confirms the traditional sectoral belief that it’s best not to put all one’s eggs in one basket, or one’s ships under the blue ensign.

Those of us who remember the fervent efforts of successive Greek governments to woo shipowners back to the Greek registry realise that the present developments are likely to be unhelpful. Social unrest is growing. Greece is insolvent: its debt load is now about 160% of its GDP. Greece is a rare — and maybe the only — country where shipping is still regarded as a fundamental national asset, accounting for nearly 30% of GNP. Shipping has for many years enjoyed preferential tax treatment. Posidonia, Greece’s famous biennial maritime bash, is the industry’s foremost global trade fair. While none of these is really at risk, there is a growing realisation that a company’s identification with Greece will sometimes be unhelpful in the global financial markets.

On the other hand, it has long been said that when times are bad in Greece, Greeks turn to the sea. Hellenic seafarer recruitment is up and is likely to grow further as shipping revives. The Hellenic shipping sector has a long history of surmounting troubles ashore. Buoyant is an apt word for it.

These risks are merely the latest problem for companies and individuals engaged by ship operators in providing (1) armed security guards, and (2) facilitation and intermediaries in making ransom payments, among other things.

The Eritrean incident seems to have begun in December, when the SEA SCORPION, a ship used as a floating accommodations for security guards, had an engine room fire, resulting in an unplanned call at the port of Massawa. Everything went downhill from there.

Meanwhile, in another part of the forest, the UK Department for Transport has announced that it is considering amendments to existing rules, that would allow armed security guards aboard UK-flagged ships.

What form these amendments would take is unclear. In the meantime, Cyprus has announced that security firms will be permitted to protect Cyprus-flagged ships, but that these service providers will be “vetted by the Cyprus Maritime Administration”.

In addition, the president of the Cyprus Union of Shipowners has stated that “guards will not be allowed to fire first”.

It’s clear that the entire situation regarding security guards remains indefinite, to say the least.

An international convention on the suppression of piracy would be a big help in clearing the air, and giving some protection to security teams and others working to free the seafarers that have been taken hostage.

It has been previously reported that Marshall Islands flag, of which, I represent, as a partner of International Registries Inc, is about to hire a private navy to protect its vessels off the Gulf of Aden.

I would like to categorically state that this is NOT the case, although we have had talks, this is very much all they were, as the legal basis for such an operation does not exist.

And this is why it is absolutely critical that the IMO puts an International Convention on the Suppression of Piracy straight to the top of its agenda as a flag state can’t sanction a private navy without a convention.

They need to act quickly and despite the soothsayers they acted quickly over ISPS and we need to see the same reaction so that security forces in the region can act with more legal certainty before the violence escalates.

Tradewinds have summed up my response nicely in their latest article.

Of course not , you would lock down everything lockable and drive just as fast as you were able. It is called sensible self-preservation, and you would be taking every reasonable precaution to avoid becoming a criminal statistic. And if you were so foolish as to be caught with nyour trousers (and windows) down in such circumstances, your insurers would tell you exactly where to put your claim.

Let us move the scene to a marine context and ask the same question. If you were taking a ship capable of 26 knots through  pirate infested waters, where you know from all reports that attacks are made regularly upon slow vessels, would you slow down to a speed that would facilitate, if not actually encourage, these criminal acts?

I only ask because it seems that many liner owners, anxious to boost their profits by mitigating the rising costs of fuel, while soothing the wrath of their shippers by telling them how this action is saving the planet and thus requires their support, are slowing down fast ships that would never normally be attacked, to speeds where such violence might be expected.

It might appear unfair to make such an accusation, but where profit, green credentials and the safety and welfare of the crew seem actually to be competing, is this priority list being somewhat skewed?  It is one thing for a gang of pirates to capture a bulk carrier, which might be wreathed in razor wire but incapable, even with the most diligent engineering staff, of more than about 14 knots. It is something of a gift horse when a pirate chief perceives a large containership, with all its numerous blind spots around its periphery, pootling along like one of these pedestrian bulkers, instead of roaring across the Indian Ocean leaving a five mile wake astern of it.

If it is indeed confirmed that the criminals have taken the opportunity of boarding and seizing a large containership in such a fashion, it would be a good idea if fuel saving and green minded liner operators started to re-examine their priorities. And, perhaps, their consciences.

Piracy – the Scourge Worsens (Guy E.C. Maitland) from MTI Network on Vimeo.