The Costa Concordia grounding is a stark reminder that sea travel remains dangerous. A modern cruise ship sailing a routine route in beautiful weather ran
aground in a matter of minutes, leaving at least 15 people dead.

About 15 million people took a cruise last year, and they are asking tough questions. Are the massive
passenger vessels stable enough to withstand a grounding or collision? Are their international crews capable of
coordinating rapid evacuations of thousands of people? Who oversees the operations of these vessels?

To read the remainder of this articles please visit http://www.philly.com/philly/opinion/inquirer/20120124_Cruise_disaster_could _have_larger_lessons.html

or the Baltimore Sun/The Philadelphia Inquirer, 24th Jan.

AS WE approach the 100th anniversary of the sinking of the Titanic this coming April, passengership safety remains an important issue.

Between 1990 and 2000, the cruise market increased by 60% and ship size grew to vessels capable of carrying well over 3,600 passengers. Naval architects have devoted attention to methods of achieving rapid and safe evacuation, particularly access to lifeboats located at various parts of the passengership’s superstructure. Chutes or slides are now available for passengers to enter lifeboats already in the water, either directly into the lifeboat, or by means of a transfer platform.
These systems are designed to be effective in unfavourable weather conditions, or when the ship has heeled over. It is, or should be, understood that passengers on board a cruiseship may not be nimble, and perhaps may be partly handicapped. This affects the design and stowage of the lifeboats.

The loss of Titanic in April 1912 began a revolution in passengership safety that has continued to the present time. Although an international conference was held in 1914, it was not until 1932 that an international convention for the safety of life at sea was agreed upon by major maritime nations. This convention has been reviewed repeatedly over the years, in the light of sometimes painful experience.

One of the biggest problems is philosophical: the great cruiseships of today are perceived by the public as large floating hotels or casinos. Significantly, modern cruiseship passengers are generally referred by liner companies as “guests”.
Nevertheless, a ship at sea, even one close to shore, is exposed to an array of hazards that cannot always be avoided. How a ship, including a large passengership, can survive such risk depends on a number of factors.

Most worrying about modern passenger vessels is the very large number of human beings on board, a factor that presents previously unprecedented logistical problems if anything goes wrong. Many observers have asked whether numbers of elderly or partly handicapped passengers can endure the stresses of a speedy emergency evacuation from a vessel that may be more than five stories high. In recent years, as passenger vessels have grown larger and larger, these issues have become more obvious.

Although a passengership casualty, when one occurs, is often referred to as “unprecedented”, the question of how to safely evacuate a ship carrying thousands of people is not new. Naval architects have raised concerns regarding the designs of passengerships repeatedly in recent years, even as computer simulations, modern materials and technology have improved the design process. To begin with, there is no such thing as an unsinkable ship, a lesson learned repeatedly over the centuries.
A continuing cause for concern is the effect of fire, or more likely loss of oxygen, within an enclosed environment. This problem of course applies in a sealed building as much as a ship. However, because of the common presence of “atriums” within many modern passenger vessels, the impact of fire or heat, and loss of oxygen, within a limited area could be dangerously enhanced, and with it, the risk of asphyxiation.

Giant cruiseships may have as many as 12 decks, and a large number of stairs, elevators and other exits, all of which, however well indicated, may be bewildering or at least unfamiliar to passengers. The design of the giant supership does not permit old-fashioned muster lifeboat drills, familiar to moviegoers of a certain age, in which passengers were sent to boat stations shortly after a voyage began. Today, such drills are often merely simulations, in which passengers are shown a video, or other form of demonstration.

The logistical problems of evacuating a giant cruiseship, carrying thousands of passengers and crew, are in urgent need of reassessment.

Among the unresolved or unpredictable variables is what happens if a significant number of lifeboats are submerged when a passengership develops a rapid and extreme list. Pictures of Costa Concordia with all of its starboard lifeboats under water illustrate that this could be a problem.

Just as in the case of Titanic, the question is not simply whether there are enough lifeboats or rafts, but whether passengers will have a reasonable amount of time to gain safe access to them. If a list develops quickly, or if weather is bad, the ship’s design must permit every possible means to safely evacuate passengers and crew.

A well-trained crew, specially trained to handle the evacuation of a large number of passengers and staff, is indispensable.

There continues to be a crying need for greater information, understanding and enforcement of regulations – as well as testing – of cargoes that may liquefy.  Nickel ore is one such.  Intercargo, the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners, has commendably been a leader in fighting for international action to protect the lives of seafarers, at risk when bulk cargo vessels, like the Supramax Vinalines Queen, suddenly disappear.

Over the years, many such losses involved vessels carrying direct reduced iron (DRI), a cargo prone to heating when wet, sometimes resulting in a disastrous explosion.  It took many years for international authorities to recognize the culpability of unscrupulous shippers and consignees – one of our industry’s little secrets.

It will be recalled that in December of 2010, three bulk carriers and their crews were lost, all as a result of cargo liquefaction.  The danger hasn’t gone away.

There is a need for stronger and clearer requirements particularly with respect to accurate information on the carriage of bulk cargoes.  The IMO has held meetings, most recently last September, of its Sub-Committee on Dangerous Goods, Solid Cargoes and Containers (DSC), with many participants, including Intercargo, The International Group of P&I Clubs, The International Union of Marine Insurers, as well as other industry associations, to take further action strengthening the requirements of the existing IMSBC Code.  A prepared schedule for nickel ore will be further reviewed this coming March, before – hopefully – its inclusion in the IMSBC Code at the forthcoming Dangerous Goods Sub-Committee in September.

The safety terminology of hazardous cargoes uses the term “Competent Authority”.  Usually, such an Authority is either a shipper at the port of loading, or receiver at the point of destination.  Rob Lomas, the Secretary General of Intercargo has called for  “…the reassurances of the Competent Authorities in…exporting countries that their procedures and processes have integrity and transparency so that this message is received and most importantly, trusted by the shipowners.  Competent Authorities are key to ensuring that seafarers’ lives are not put in danger”.

It is also clear that bulker losses like that of the Vinalines Queen are taking place within specific trades, and with similar destinations in the Far East.  It would be very helpful if the International Maritime Organization (IMO) could study these specific trades, with the objective of getting the word out on hazardous bulk cargoes.  Many of the ships that have been lost have crews and flag states that are not likely to have gotten the necessary information on the risks involved, and the measures that need to be taken, in handling dangerous or difficult cargoes.

The Vinalines Queen was built in 2005, and from all available information was in satisfactory condition.  Its loss is another tragedy that didn’t need to happen.

At the same time, the termination of the Global Maritime and Transportation School (GMATS), which has been at the forefront of professional training since its founding in 1994, seems to be another illustration of an “asleep at the switch” attitude toward our urgent maritime requirements. The two episodes have more in common than might at first appear.

Up to now, GMATS, located at King’s Point, has provided more than 140 maritime education and training programs, including four categories: nautical science and military training, marine engineering, transportation logistics and management. In 2010, more than 4,000 students were enrolled in GMATS programs. All of this now comes to an end, although the various state-sponsored maritime academies will no doubt attempt to take up the slack.

Many of the courses offered have particular significance in educating mariners in the finer points of safety management, a matter of increasing concern in our complex transportation environment. Bridge resource management, decision making, situational awareness, master/pilot relationships and voyage planning were among the courses on offer. Many of these courses were tailored to the equipment employed aboard ships owned by the companies sponsoring the students themselves.

The United States lacks a coherent policy for the advancement of seafarer education. Dedicated maritime professionals are basically taking the lead with little or no national support.

Nevertheless, the United States is dependent to a constantly growing degree on safe and successful maritime systems. Since 1852, when the Steamboat Inspection Service was formed, the United States Coast Guard has certified and licensed our seafarers, with licenses at first issued to masters, chief mates, engineers and pilots. Certificates for lifeboatmen and able seamen were inaugurated in 1915, following the loss of the TITANIC.

In 1936, the Officers’ Competency Certificates Convention was adopted, bringing with it more advanced requirements. The growing regulatory impact of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW), which was adopted in 1978 and entered into force in 1984, has had a massive impact on standards and qualifications for officers and watch personnel on seagoing merchant ships. Advances in technology resulted in amendments in 1995, and last year.

Seafarers throughout the world are familiar with bridge training simulators, which have revolutionized the way in which navigation and watchkeeping are taught. Programs like that of GMATS provide training in docking and undocking, bridge-to-bridge communications, safe navigation and the handling of towing vessels, barges and other craft in differing conditions of visibility, wind, current, traffic and unpredictable situations. Master/pilot communications, crisis management and the finer points of situational awareness are an important part of the course content, which go beyond the requirements mandated by the U.S. Coast Guard and the STCW Convention.

The provision of skills-based training, involving visual piloting, paper, electronic chart plotting, radar/ARPA and traffic management are all essentials in learning safe navigation in a complex variety of potential conditions that may occur on a vessel. The United States Merchant Marine Academy has been a leader in the development of Coast Guard-certified electronic display courses, which have themselves been the underpinning for the recent revisions to the STCW Convention. It is clear that a simulation-equipped classroom environment is a critically important teaching tool, in addition to the solo navigation training provided by use of simulators. What has been called the “revolution in navigation and visual training”, propelled by advances in Electronic Chart Display and Information Service (ECDIS) navigational training, has brought great advances in the programs offered at King’s Point and the federally regulated state maritime academies. As a result, ECDIS was included in the 2009 STCW Code and Guidance revisions that are part of the 2010 Manila Amendments.

At the International Maritime Organization (IMO), governments have strongly supported assessment criteria for heightened navigational competencies, uniform standards for ECDIS training, and guidance for vessel operators and flag states. The U.S Coast Guard has proposed requirements implementing the STCW Amendments, requiring all deck watch officers assign to ECDIS-equipped vessels to “provide evidence of meeting the standard of competence” in ECDIS, and formulating the standards for such skills for United States mariners. A responsible approach to maritime education will require a comprehensive plan that is not at the mercy of the failures of political Washington.

Here in the United States, however, one thing cuts across all of the niche markets and special interests:  we need leadership.  Nowhere is this more apparent then in the somewhat veiled circumstances of the firing (because that is what it was) of Admiral Philip H. Greene Jr. as Superintendent of the United States Merchant Marine Academy, also known as King’s Point, located on Long Island Sound, within sight of the New York State Maritime Academy, across the water in the Bronx.

This has been followed by an order from the United States Maritime Administration (MARAD), closing down GMATS, a self-funded graduate training program based at the Academy.  Now MARAD is taking away the Academy’s training ship, the KING’S POINTER, transferring it to Galveston, Texas, where it may be refurbished, and could be made available to the Texas Maritime Academy (Texas A&M) for its own training needs.

Admiral Greene’s removal is the third such incident in fairly rapid succession since shortly before the start of the Obama administration.  While various reasons have been given, the fact that the superintendency of King’s Point has become more of a merry-go-round than the presidency of some Central American banana republics in former times has made the job highly unattractive, and the butt of sarcastic remarks.

Significantly, the present Maritime Administrator, David Matsuda, has been the subject of widespread dissatisfaction and, to a degree, open expressions of contempt.  Mr. Matsuda comes from a career as a political staffer on Capitol Hill.  His background lies in railroad regulation, and his lack of knowledge of shipping became apparent even before his appointment at the start of the Obama administration.  It is said that he owes his position very largely to the support of Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey.

In bygone times, MARAD Administrators (as the head of the agency is described) were selected after a careful vetting by U.S. maritime unions, and leading figures in the private sector.  Recently, the same unions issued a blast denouncing MARAD for the production and issuance of a report that graphically described the drawbacks of U.S. flag restrictions, particularly in terms of cost, in comparison with U.S-owned tonnage registered in foreign flags.

It is not clear why American maritime unions were willing to accept Mr. Matsuda’s appointment in the first place, particularly as they have now turned on him.  It is also unclear why the U.S.-flag maritime industry, which is heavily staffed by alumni of King’s Point, is so docile in face of the steady amputation of essential parts of the Academy itself.

King’s Point is largely a product of the Second World War, at a time when mariners were desperately needed to crew the gray-hulled Liberty and Victory ships and tankers that, produced in huge numbers, made a major contribution to Allied victory.  Today, it and the other American maritime academies maintained as state-chartered institutions, still produce large numbers of well-trained merchant mariners.  But if the U.S. government is seemingly oblivious to the importance of the shipping sector, there is no sign that the maritime industry itself is willing to step forward in defense of its vital educational institution on the north shore of Long Island.

It has been observed that the industry’s lack of leadership, and indeed lack of concern, resembles its response – or lack there of – on many other issues.  The industry, in the United States and indeed overseas, is very short of individuals willing to take the risk of speaking out, and perhaps of being unpopular.  This has sometimes been called “middle-managementitis”.  As the world economic recession threatens the survival of many shipping companies regardless of the flag that they fly, there is a sense that much of the maritime industry here in the United States is running out of time.

In the United States, we need a strong and focused government maritime policy.  This policy should contain the following elements:

1. Education and training must be more strongly supported by the private sector.  It is unlikely that there will be much federal funding available in the near future, so let’s roll up our sleeves.
2. The politicization of the Maritime Administration (MARAD) is in many ways detrimental to the development of a strong U.S. maritime policy.  When it does get things right, it is often undercut by special interests and short-termers within the maritime sector and the U.S. government.  This is an agency in need of a good sweeping out, and a solid policy direction.
3. “Maritime policy” must mean (as it doesn’t, at present) one that covers the entire U.S. based industry, regardless of flag.  The emphasis must be on jobs for American seafarers, and on training policies that make sense.
4. About 95% of all American freight is hauled on our interstate highways.  The levels of congestion, and the social and environmental costs, keep growing.  The failure to develop short-sea shipping is largely due to the remarkably high cost of building tugs, barges, and other ships in U.S. shipyards.   The legal requirement that all such ships must be “built American” has supposedly destroyed the possibility of a successful coastwise shipping program.
5. But has it?  The industry is waiting for a new Henry J. Kaiser, who built so many of the ships that braved the Battle of the Atlantic.  Is it absolutely certain that an American yard or yards cannot turn out ships, tugs and barges at a competitive price?  For that matter, is it certain that it is impossible to profitably run a U.S. coastwise operation with U.S. crews, if we do manage to get rid of the “build American” requirement?
6. It has long been clear that if a new generation of Americans is to be recruited to careers in the shipping industry, with seagoing experience leading into numerous shoreside opportunities, serious support for training must be provided.  It is generally agreed by our maritime unions, as well as private-sector companies, and within MARAD itself, that the decline of the U.S. flag has been caused by uncompetitive practices, taxation, over-regulation and the failure to develop a coherent maritime policy.  The United States has some of the best maritime training schools in the world, with cadets that are among the most highly motivated that can be found anywhere.  But a real commitment by the U.S. government is not evident.
7. Shipping is still an excellent industry with pride in its achievements and the capacity to expand to meet the needs of a growing nation, and indeed the world.  The tone, however, must be set by government, and that is what is presently missing.  The industry, and the nation, deserves a Maritime Administration, and a maritime policy, that is worthy of national support and international respect.

There were over 400 senior Chinese leaders present and the basis of my speech was to urge them to think about two key concepts: firstly that clean seas are good for business; and secondly that marine environment protection is an essential strategy for corporate risk management.

Times are hard globally at the moment with countless economic pressures, rising insurance costs, and growing regulatory pressure, however no shipowner, or charterer, should neglect its risk management procedures. One lesson of the Erika, Prestige, Cosco Busan and other recent oil spills is that the cost, to owners, operators and charterers, of damage to the marine environment is by no means proportionate to the amount of oil spilled.

What’s more so-called ‘strict liability’ rules, regarding damages, mean that even if a ship’s owner or operator is not directly at fault, the facts—political and legal—are that a ship operator’s liability for environment harm will most likely be considerable, virtually unlimited, and, in the U.S., ‘strict’– that is, liability regardless of actual fault. A lesson we should all take careful note of.

The shipowning community needs to take responsibility for minimizing human error both on board ships and ashore and as such should work towards environmental excellence and promotion of safety at all times.  I told the forum I believe that this can be achieved by following these important suggestions:

1. hiring quality personnel;

2. training in accordance with a formal teaching system;

3. the identification of problems;

4. rewarding environmental excellence and safety performance;

5. communication;

6. empowerment;

7. responsibility;

8. respect;

9. integrity; and

10. emphasizing the need for willingness to change bad habits, and correct mistakes.

Another suggestion offered to the audience was to avoid “beancounter-ism” at all costs.  I stressed how important it was for them to be able to assess the adequacy of their safety and environmental budgets…and broke the news that this means spending money now, in order to save more later.  Ensuring your financial staff are on board with this and also subscribe to specific quality, safety and environmental goals will help you to achieve these aims. Budgets need to be everyone’s business and shortfalls must be resolved BEFORE an oil spill or other disaster occurs.

The Senior Maritime Forum was sponsored by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the Ministry of Transport of the People’s Republic of China, along with the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government.  The Forum included environmental, shipbuilding, ship finance and offshore sessions. It was held in tandem with Marintec China 2011, which attracted over 60,000 visitors to an exhibition which is one of the largest maritime events in the world.

SWANLAND was a small, roughly 2000 gt dry bulker, bound from Colwyn Bay to Cowes in the Isle of Wight;  with her cargo of limestone, she must have gone
down quickly, after, according to the survivors, having been struck by a massive wave. It was reported that, in a mayday received at 0200 hours, her
hull cracked.

Built in 1977, she was registered in the Cook Islands.

SWANLAND had a poor port state control record, according to Lloyd’s List, including a finding in the past year that her hatchcovers were not
sufficiently watertight; fire and safety equipment not properly maintained; and life rafts not properly fitted. It is reported that the ship previously
went aground off Yarmouth, while loaded with 2,700 tons of wheat. On that occasion, her crew of eight seem
to have been unharmed. It is also reported that in August 2010, SWANLAND’s engines failed; it was, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence casualty
reports, towed into Falmouth after nearly grounding off the Lizard peninsula.

Last week, SWANLAND was at sea in a heavy gale.

So six seafarers have been lost. We think,  and say, that such things matter a great deal; that substandardships, flag states and operators do exist; and with the most hostile economic conditions in a generation assailing the industry, badly maintained ships are reappearing — and will grow in number. The prevailing culture of government costcutting, in the beleaguered United States and Europe, is also a grim omen for the future of maritime safety.

When we fail to take effective measures against substandard shipping, we disgrace ourselves. No doubt the SWANLAND fell through more than a few
cracks; those cracks may be the familiar ones, perhaps including the ship’s classification society, flag state, and local port state control. There may
be others. Would a full, public — and consequential — inquiry be asking too much?

An ancient hymn invokes God’s protection for “those in peril on the sea”.

Which doesn’t exonerate us.

At the present time, the Greek-flag fleet (that is, ships flying the Greek ensign, and registered in that country, as distinct from Greek-owned) is the eighth largest by tonnage in the world, aggregating some 41.8 million GT.  However, merchant shipping under Greek beneficial ownership totals more than 4,600 vessels, of 147 million GT presently in operation.

Although 94% of shipping under the Greek flag is said to be owned by companies that are ultimately Greek, many of the most notable Greek shipping companies are based abroad, particularly in London.  Therefore, to a large extent, these companies and their ships are protected from Greece’s present economic troubles.

Greek owners are the largest distinct nationality within the European Union, and Greece has overtaken Germany as the owner country with the most valuable fleet, estimated to be worth $87.9 billion compared to an estimated $86 billion for the German fleet.  Greek owners also have more vessels on order, with, according to Clarkson Research Services, some 605 ships, of a combined 35.2 million GT.

German owners have approximately 518 vessels, aggregating about 18.5 million GT, on order.

Greek owners have been the most prominent in the demolition category during 2011, scrapping 5.3 million GT worth of vessels, of an average age of 29.5 years.  The effect of this has been to reduce the average age of the Greek owned fleet to 16.8 years, 4.1 years lower than the average worldwide total.

Up to now, it has been clear that no change in the favourable tax treatment of shipping revenues is contemplated by the new Athens government.  But the economic and fiscal cataclysm now threatening to engulf all of Europe puts us in mind of Heraclitus’ warning.  The winds of change are clearly blowing.

On December 5, under the pressure of financial crisis and with the euro at stake, the two main leaders of the euro zone proclaimed that they would work to remake the European Union into a more integrated political and economic federation, with tight legal restraints on national parliaments.

This is a crucial week, ending with a European Union summit on Thursday and Friday.  Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy have called for amendments to European treaties that would include centralized oversight over budgets and automatic sanctions against countries that “violate firmer rules on deficits.”  Such changes, if enacted, would effectively subordinate economic sovereignty to collective discipline enforced by European technocrats in Brussels, and, though, none dare speak the name, Berlin.

It does not take much imagination to realize that Greece’s national laws, and indeed its constitution, that in effect ring-fence shipping-related revenues from heavy tax treatment, would be subject to unfriendly scrutiny in Brussels, Paris and Berlin, at least to the extent that they would be vulnerable to revision and override.

Moreover, Messrs Sarkozy and Merkel stated yesterday that Greece was “unique”, and that no other country would have its debt restructured as Greece’s will.  Mr. Sarkozy remarked that “it is a strange idea to think that France and Germany would pay for the debt of others, without any control over that debt.”

As they say in Russia, “draw your own conclusions”.

Of course, the Paris-Berlin proposal threatens to divide the 17 European Union countries that use the euro from the 27 nations that are part of the larger European Union, some of which, like the United Kingdom, are likely to reject intrusive budget oversight from the aforementioned northern European capitals.

Nevertheless, the two leaders are aiming at a new treaty.

It is no surprise that the Greek-flag merchant marine is beginning to diminish in size, although the actual extent of its recent drop is uncertain.  The Greek-owned merchant marine, not merely that under Greek registry, is one of the few clear economic assets, other than sunny weather, beautiful scenery and tourism, that Greece can currently count on.  Greece will fight hard against what one shipowner privately refers to as “the policies of the Fourth Reich”.

In the 17^th century, the men, women and children of the Greek island of Andros, beset by Turkish persecution, took to their ships, sailed out of the Mediterranean, and after a long voyage, arrived at the Pool of London.  There, they petitioned King Charles II and his brother, the future James II, for asylum.

Knowing a good deal when they saw it, and exercising rare good judgment for the Stuarts, protection was granted.  Moreover, the crown authorized the construction of the first Orthodox Church in London, on a street in a location in what is now called Soho, thereafter named Greek Street.  The rest, as they say, is history, and there are loads of British families today claiming descent from the first expeditionary force of Andros refugees.

While cataclysms still happen, history still has its rhythms, resonance and patterns.  This time, however, the refugees will be considerably more affluent, and they may head for New York and Singapore, instead of London.

The deteriorating health of the euro, and the growing likelihood that Brussels will resort to some sort of horrific fiscal union in the near future, are raising questions about the future of the European Union itself. Critics worry that members of the bloc will  confront ever larger losses of sovereignty, and be strapped into a one-size-fits-all currency that probably will not suit each country’s economy.

This situation may contribute to policy friction between EU members, but unlike the well-known grit in an oyster’s shell’s producing a precious pearl, the result would not be pleasant to behold.  Displays of political — indeed, theatrical — irritability are usually not constructive.  They often resemble a barroom brawl.

Which brings us to consideration of our particular apple cart: EMSA, the European Maritime Safety Agency. EMSA would not exist, were it not for an expression of political will — by politicians, no less.  We in the shipping industry are, so to speak, industrious critics of those politicians who, as we tirelessly remind one another, don’t understand shipping, and never will.

But then there’s EMSA. Its arrival on the scene, lest we forget, came about as a result of events that caused even us to concede that all was not well with matters maritime — at least when it came to keeping ships safely afloat. A “quiet life” it wasn’t. The 1987 investigation after the sinking of the ro/ro ferry Herald of Free Enterprise, headed by Sir Barry Sheen, is recognized as having shown that local oversight alone wasn’t always sufficient.  The inquiry into the Braer tanker accident off the Shetlands in 1993, chaired by Lord Donaldson, gave rise to a report, “Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas“, mapping the need for commitment to primary safety goals set by the IMO, while calling for an operationally effective regulatory framework.

The losses of the Erika and Prestige (the latter off Spain in November, 2002) showed the need for, among other things, a higher level of professional skill in responding to a casualty (ports of refuge, anyone?); better use of available resources; a greater degree of preparedness; and a more competent, coordinated and cooperative approach to the conduct of investigations.

EMSA, created by the European Parliament in 2002, is essentially a service provider, supporting the EU Commission in implementing EU laws on marine pollution preparedness, detection and response. It also advises the EU on ship security, seafarer training, port state control, classification societies and certification of marine equipment. As such, it helps make policy.

So, what has all this to do with the upsetting of apple carts, my late uncle, or the fragile health of the euro? What is happening now is threatening to tip over the fragile comity of the eurozone (the apple cart), and therefore the quarrelsome member states themselves (remember those politicians), must not disrupt the work of useful bodies and agencies such as EMSA, which is itself an apple cart. What’s more, it’s OUR apple cart.

Anyone who ever had to deal with certain national governments after an incident at sea can attest to the need for, and value of a pan-European maritime safety agency. The process of getting agreement, at the IMO, on accepted principles for co-operation between port states, coastal states and flag states, simply on co-operation in conducting maritime investigations,was, before the advent of EMSA, like undergoing root canal surgery without anesthetic.

In Europe at least, EMSA has made a successful start on a harmonized system of maritime safety throughout the EU. If you wish to test how well off we are, please note the troubles that Mr. Kallas, the EU Transport Commissioner, is now having trying to unscramble the bloc’s dangerously chaotic air-traffic system. And do thank those politicians for creating EMSA.